Strategy & Philosophy
Tactical History
Classical military strategy, historical defense theory, and geopolitical statecraft from Clausewitz's On War. Covers friction, fog of war, center of gravity, decisive points, and the relationship between war and political policy.
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- 1,267
- Network total
- 91,799
- ZKP digest
- a3ab5e84bee4339faa08ca2fab8cb090fc3e719be1f898ff85c96d40851faf70
Primary sources
- Clausewitz On War (Gutenberg)
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EBOOK ON WAR *** Produced by Charles Keller and David Widger On War by General Carl von Clausewitz TRANSLATED BY COLONEL J.J. GRAHAM 1874 was 1st edition of this translation. 1909 was the London reprinting. NEW AND REVISED EDITION WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND NOTES BY COLONEL F.N. MAUDE C.B. (LATE R.E.) EIGHTH IMPRESSION IN THREE VOLUMES Contents INTRODUCTION PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION NOTICE THE INTRODUCTION OF THE AUTHOR BRIEF MEMOIR OF GENERAL CLAUSEWITZ BOOK I. ON THE NATURE OF WAR CHAPTER I. What is War? CHAPTER II. Ends and Means in War CHAPTER III. The Genius for War CHAPTER IV. Of Danger in War CHAPTER V. Of Bodily Exertion in War CHAPTER VI. Information in War CHAPTER VII. Friction in War CHAPTER VIII. Concluding Remarks, Book I BOOK II. ON THE THEORY OF WAR CHAPTER I. Branches of the Art of War CHAPTER II. On the Theory of War CHAPTER III. Art or Science of War CHAPTER IV. Methodicism CHAPTER V. Criticism CHAPTER VI. On Examples BOOK III. OF STRATEGY IN GENERAL CHAPTER I. Strategy CHAPTER II. Elements of Strategy CHAPTER III. Moral Forces CHAPTER IV. The Chief Moral Powers CHAPTER V. Military Virtue of an Army CHAPTER VI. Boldness CHAPTER VII. Perseverance CHAPTER VIII. Superiority of Numbers CHAPTER IX. The Surprise CHAPTER X. Stratagem CHAPTER XI. Assembly of Forces in Space CHAPTER XII. Assembly of Forces in Time CHAPTER XIII. Strategic Reserve CHAPTER XIV.
As a leader on the field of battle, on the other hand, he would not have been so much in his right place, from a _manque d’habitude du commandement_, he wanted the art _d’enlever les troupes_.” After the Prussian Army of Observation was dissolved, Clausewitz returned to Breslau, and a few days after his arrival was seized with cholera, the seeds of which he must have brought with him from the army on the Polish frontier. His death took place in November 1831. His writings are contained in nine volumes, published after his death, but his fame rests most upon the three volumes forming his treatise on “War.” In the present attempt to render into English this portion of the works of Clausewitz, the translator is sensible of many deficiencies, but he hopes at all events to succeed in making this celebrated treatise better known in England, believing, as he does, that so far as the work concerns the interests of this country, it has lost none of the importance it possessed at the time of its first publication. J. J. GRAHAM (_Col._) BOOK I. ON THE NATURE OF WAR CHAPTER I. What is War? 1. INTRODUCTION. We propose to consider first the single elements of our subject, then each branch or part, and, last of all, the whole, in all its relations—therefore to advance from the simple to the complex.
As regards the strictly military side of this work, though the recent researches of the French General Staff into the records and documents of the Napoleonic period have shown conclusively that Clausewitz had never grasped the essential point of the Great Emperor’s strategic method, yet it is admitted that he has completely fathomed the spirit which gave life to the form; and notwithstanding the variations in application which have resulted from the progress of invention in every field of national activity (not in the technical improvements in armament alone), this spirit still remains the essential factor in the whole matter. Indeed, if anything, modern appliances have intensified its importance, for though, with equal armaments on both sides, the form of battles must always remain the same, the facility and certainty of combination which better methods of communicating orders and intelligence have conferred upon the Commanders has rendered the control of great masses immeasurably more certain than it was in the past. Men kill each other at greater distances, it is true—but killing is a constant factor in all battles.
Limited Object—Offensive War CHAPTER VIII. Limited Object—Defence CHAPTER IX. Plan of War When the Destruction of the Enemy is the Object INTRODUCTION The Germans interpret their new national colours—black, red, and white—by the saying, “Durch Nacht und Blut zur licht.” (“Through night and blood to light”), and no work yet written conveys to the thinker a clearer conception of all that the red streak in their flag stands for than this deep and philosophical analysis of “War” by Clausewitz. It reveals “War,” stripped of all accessories, as the exercise of force for the attainment of a political object, unrestrained by any law save that of expediency, and thus gives the key to the interpretation of German political aims, past, present, and future, which is unconditionally necessary for every student of the modern conditions of Europe. Step by step, every event since Waterloo follows with logical consistency from the teachings of Napoleon, formulated for the first time, some twenty years afterwards, by this remarkable thinker.
The Attack in Relation to the Defence CHAPTER II. Nature of the Strategical Attack CHAPTER III. On the Objects of Strategical Attack CHAPTER IV. Decreasing Force of the Attack CHAPTER V. Culminating Point of the Attack CHAPTER VI. Destruction of the Enemy’s Armies CHAPTER VII. The Offensive Battle CHAPTER VIII. Passage of Rivers CHAPTER IX. Attack on Defensive Positions CHAPTER X. Attack on an Entrenched Camp CHAPTER XI. Attack on a Mountain Range CHAPTER XII. Attack on Cordon Lines CHAPTER XIII. Manœuvering CHAPTER XIV. Attack on Morasses, Inundations, Woods CHAPTER XV. Attack on a Theatre of War with the View to a Decision CHAPTER XVI. Attack on a Theatre of War without the View to a Great Decision CHAPTER XVII. Attack on Fortresses CHAPTER XVIII. Attack on Convoys CHAPTER XIX. Attack on the Enemy’s Army in its Cantonments CHAPTER XX. Diversion CHAPTER XXI. Invasion CHAPTER XXII. On the Culminating Point of Victory BOOK VIII. PLAN OF WAR CHAPTER I. Introduction CHAPTER II. Absolute and Real War CHAPTER III. A. Interdependence of the Parts in a War CHAPTER III. B. On the Magnitude of the Object of the War and the Efforts to be Made CHAPTER IV. Ends in War More Precisely Defined—Overthrow of the Enemy CHAPTER V. Ends in War More Precisely Defined (_continued_)—Limited Object CHAPTER VI. A. Influence of the Political Object on the Military Object CHAPTER VI. B. War as an Instrument of Policy CHAPTER VII.